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Summary at a Glance 
We explore whether management compensation incentives and supply contracting incentives in the Local 
Government Authorities are related to asset revaluation behaviour. Finding no such relationship, we 
conclude that the lack of opportunistic self-interest effects suggests that the application of an IFRS 
framework to local government reporting is not at face value inappropriate. 
Abstract 
This paper examines an implication of applying IFRS to the government sector in Australia. We posit both a 
self-interest and a transparency motivation for local governments effecting revaluations of both 
Infrastructure Assets and Community Land. The self-interest motivation was expected to manifest as a 
relationship between the amount of revaluation and CEO (or management team) remuneration. The 
transparency motivation was expected to result in a relationship between revaluation and the extent of 
spending on these assets, measured as both quantum of Materials and Contracts Expense, and as the 
quantum of contracts awarded by the entity above the disclosure threshold. We also speculated that 
revaluations may be used to signal to state governments a need for additional funds through capital and/or 
operating grants. At conventional levels of significance, we find no support for these relationships, 
suggesting that agency motivations at the local government level are either more subtle or non-existent. As 
local government authorities in our study follow a reporting framework and standardised accounting 
procedures prescribed by the State government (in compliance with applicable AASB/IFRS standards), 
financial and public accountabilities are also likely to be a driver for the valuation of local infrastructure 
assets at fair value, and that this is not likely to be undermined by the opportunistic incentives we have 
considered. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been a wealth of discussion and critique of the adoption and implementation 
of accrual accounting in the public sector in various jurisdictions. The earliest adopters 
were New Zealand and Australia (Lye et al., 2005). Both followed a sector-neutral 
approach to accounting standard setting, i.e., one set of accounting standards for private, 
public and non-profit sectors (Hooks and Tooley, 2007). By contrast, Simpkins (2006, 
p. 100) has pointed out that, in the U.S.A., Canada and the U.K. where separate standard 
setting boards have been assigned responsibility for the public and private sectors, the 
needs of public sector users are given more attention. Recent developments have 
however seen New Zealand standard setters adopting a sector‐specific standard‐setting 
approach for the public sector based on International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards, and the for‐profit sector continuing to follow International Financial 
Reporting Standards (Laswad and Redmayne, 2015).  
The critique of the implementation of accrual accounting in the public sector, 
comprising both Government Trading Enterprises and non-profit government 
departments and other entities, is not about the use of accrual accounting in itself, but is 
more concerned with the implementation of accrual accounting as adopted by profit-
seeking business entities in the private sector, based on the claim of likeness between 
the two sectors. The proposition that the adoption and development of accrual 
accounting in the public sector is fundamentally a technical development intended to 
improve transparency and accountability, or that accounting standard setting is a neutral 
process, has been disputed in a number of studies (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; 
Guthrie, 1998; Carlin, 2005; Barton, 2005; Elwood and Newberry, 2007; Ryan et al., 
2007). In Pilcher (2011), one insightful critique holds that the idea of sector-neutral 
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accounting standards is only for the benefit of the standard-setters so that they do not 
have to address the requirements and issues specific to the public sector. By contrast, 
some evidence supports the idea that application of accrual accounting in government 
has been useful. For example, following the adoption of the accrual-based GASB 
Statement No.34 (Basic Financial Statements—and Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis—for State and Local Governments, 1999), the GASB No.34 Statement of Net 
Assets was found to provide information relevant for assessing school districts’ default 
risk (Plummer, Hutchinson, and. Patton, 2007). In another study, Baber and Gore 
(2008) find that accrual-based GAAP requirements reduce municipal borrowing costs. 
The Australian sector-neutral approach, applying IFRS to non-business entities, begs the 
question of whether motivations and other empirically examined phenomena from the 
business environment apply equally to the non-profit and government sectors. In this 
paper, therefore, we take a first step in examining the extent of parallels between these 
sectors on the one hand, and business on the other. As accounting is essentially 
technically similar across all entities, the issue we grapple with is that of whether the 
motivational context carries over. In this regard, we examine a key motivational driver 
in business (managerial remuneration) as well as motivations relating to the nature of 
contracting in the Australian public sector. 
Many have thus questioned the extent to which governance of the public services using 
a framework drawn from private sector principles is applicable. The applicability hinges 
upon whether the needs of shareholders in the private sector and stakeholders in public 
services are the same (Guthrie, 1998; Barton, 2005). Misapplication of the framework 
drawn from for-profit private sector to the public sector can not only distort the reported 
“bottom line” of the entities but can also misrepresent a number of financial key 
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performance indicators (FKPIs) upon which entity performance is judged (Pilcher, 
2009). The former addresses the needs of profit-oriented entities, while the latter is 
anchored in community service. We focus on a particularly salient issue in local 
government entities: the treatment of infrastructure assets. Australia’s Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) acknowledges the fact that IFRSs are written for for-profit 
entities, and that IFRSs do not deal well with non-exchange transactions (e.g., grants, 
donations, taxes) and non-cash generating activities (e.g., heritage assets, infrastructure 
assets) unique to the public sector (FRC, 2012).  
To date there has been a number of studies conducted into the infrastructure asset 
valuation practices of local government authorities (LGAs) in Australia (Walker et al., 
1999; Pilcher, 2002; Walker et al., 2004; Pilcher, 2006; Molland and Clift, 2008; 
Pilcher, 2009; Walker and Jones, 2012), but not empirically as to what drives these 
practices. Our study examines plausible incentives by LGAs to undertake valuations and 
revaluations of their major infrastructure assets. The local government sector is 
economically and socially significant, managing physical assets worth about $438 
billion and spending around $34 billion annually, or 6 per cent, of total public sector 
spending in Australia. In non-metropolitan areas, local government is often one of the 
largest employers (Australian Local Government Association, 2017).  Core 
infrastructure services, such as roads and bridges, provided by local government (alone 
or in conjunction with other level of government) are key to facilitating economic 
activity. 
Our study seeks to explore accounting for community and infrastructure assets 
(excluding heritage assets) that serve functional and largely economic purposes such as 
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land, road surfaces, bridges, footpaths, stormwater drainage, swimming pools and other 
recreational assets.  
This study has four objectives. First, we seek to elucidate whether managerial 
remuneration incentivises valuations and subsequent revaluations of Community Land 
and local infrastructure assets at fair value by local government authorities. Second, we 
explore a transparency motivation, based on contracting efficiency, that local 
government entities recognise valuations and subsequent revaluations of Community 
Land and local infrastructure assets to advise the local community of the LGA’s 
quantum of assets under management as well as to telegraph future project opportunities 
to service contract bidders.i The pattern of outsourcing and the scale and scope of local 
government activity is of interest to service contract bidders since such information is 
useful to them in forecasting their own future service contract opportunities with the 
local authorities and the State government (which finances larger regional development 
undertakings). More contractor bids for each project serve to make the bidding process 
more competitive and transparent and offer more options for a local government entity. 
Third, we explore a plausible relationship between asset revaluation by LGAs and their 
applications for Operating/Capital Grants from the State government. In the context of 
local government infrastructure assets, their underlying future benefits are the services 
that a local government is expected to deliver to its community. To assert their 
obligations to maintain and enhance infrastructure assets, we posit that asset valuation at 
fair value and asset revaluation are a means by which LGAs seek to attract more 
external funding, namely Operating/Capital Grants from the State government. The 
fourth objective of this paper is to test the proposition that a high ratio for depreciation 
5 
charges as a proportion of total expense is indicative of a not-for-profit public sector 
entity’s propensity to outsource (Carlin, 2005). 
Notwithstanding the lack of confirmatory results, our findings – that asset revaluations 
do not appear to be motivated by opportunistic self-interest – give comfort about the 
suitability of the financial reporting framework for the LGAs in our study. 
2. Institutional Setting and Background 
Broadbent and Guthrie (2008) conduct a survey of prior studies spanning 20 years into 
the accounting related specifically to the public sector. They identify and classify these 
studies into several major categories, including management accounting and control/ 
budgeting and performance management; external reporting; finance/capital budgeting; 
auditing/evaluation; and accountability and governance. In relation to the imposition of 
accounting systems, they emphasise that ‘[a] matter of concern is whether the 
accounting systems imposed or adopted help to make transparent or obscure the actions 
of the organisations in question (p.152)’.  
In this research, we focus on the key differences between for-profit and public sector 
(specifically LGA) accounting. Earlier research into public sector accounting identifies 
a number of key dimensions on which public sector research is conditioned: (1) the 
applicability of accrual accounting in the public sector; (2) the users of financial 
reporting in these sector; (3) the way in which financial reporting is used in the sector; 
(4) possible motivations for the way in which conventional accrual accounting is 
applied in the sector; and (5) the oftentimes distinct nature of assets held by the sector. 
We discuss these five research areas in the remainder of this section. 
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First, a number of studies question the wisdom of the adoption of for-profit accrual 
accounting practices by the public sector. Barton (2004) points out that with two 
exceptions (AAS 16 Financial Reporting by Segments and AAS 22 Related Party 
Disclosures), all the business accounting standards were applied to the public sector, 
plus three standards specifically promulgated for the public sector, namely AAS27 
Financial Reporting by Local Governments (1996), AAS29 Financial Reporting by 
Government Departments (1996), and AAS31 Financial Reporting by Governments 
(1996). These three standards however are still based on the business accounting 
standards and merely modify them to accommodate some government departmental 
administrative arrangements.  
Christiaens and Rommel (2008) summarise some reasons why applying the concept of 
profit/loss to the not-for-profit public sector is fraught with serious conceptual issues. 
First, the concept of profit has no meaning in governments. Since governmental inputs 
and governmental outputs are not directly related, there can be no concept of profit 
(Parry, 2005, p. 62). Second, unlike for-profit enterprises, it is not appropriate to judge 
governments on the difference between their revenues and their costs because their 
revenues (and net profits) are not their real outcomes. A third serious issue in 
governmental accrual accounting is the feature of non-exchange transactions. In such 
transactions there is no direct causal relationship between amounts received and their 
corresponding costs. Examples are taxes, subsidies, donations, grants, etc. They 
conclude that accrual accounting in the not-for-profit public sector makes the incorrect 
assumption that economic outputs represent the level of social services. This assumption 
is correct however when the government engages in business-like activities. Then, the 
output is not social but economic and measurable in terms of revenues (and net profits). 
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The second dimension of prior research consists of identifying the users of financial 
reporting information and their respective needs. Mack and Ryan (2006) use a survey 
methodology to access users of government department general purpose financial 
reports to study actual users across the entire public sector. Their evidence suggests that 
general-purpose financial reports are used to satisfy financial accountability and public 
accountability rather than decision making; that is: users have an accountability focus 
rather than a ‘decision-usefulness’ focus. This is inconsistent with the conceptual 
underpinnings articulated in the AASB and IASB Conceptual Frameworks. Further, 
Mack and Ryan find that internal users, namely those having a role in the management, 
operation or governance of the entities, were more predominant than external users. 
This finding is inconsistent with most of the theoretical studies that emphasise external 
users, but is consistent with other studies (Coy et al., 1997; and Clark, 2002) that 
surveyed the actual users of specific reports in an attempt to obtain information about 
users and their information needs.  
Related to this is the third dimension public sector research of how users consume 
financial information. Priest et al. (1999) find in their surveys of three user groups of 
local government authorities’ annual financial statements that respondents regard 
performance items and cost of service items as important disclosure items in annual 
financial statements. Their finding confirms that the type of information included in 
financial statements by local government is perceived as important information by 
ratepayers, business groups and service providers.  
Bradbury and Scott (2015) find that financial information can be useful to constituents 
for holding elected officials in New Zealand accountable. Specifically the study tested 
whether the difference between the actual operating expenditure as reported in the 
8 
annual report and as forecasted is associated with electoral outcomes. They find that 
accounting performance and the sign of accounting performance (i.e., expenditure over-
runs) are associated with greater councillor re-election. In brief, the study provides 
evidence of a link between accounting and electoral results, inferring that accounting 
information has information content and can convey good/bad news to constituents. The 
result is also consistent with the argument that the budgeting process, not the financial 
reporting process, provides the basis for contracting between the governing coalition 
and constituents (Baber, 1994). 
A fourth aspect of the prior research has examined the motivations for applying 
accounting techniques and for the choices made within that application process. 
Ultimately the public sector’s move to accrual accounting, as well as the application 
choices made, resolve to a decision to apply different measurement rules and hence to 
attribute different values to components of the financial statements. A series of studies 
in Australia has documented the application of accrual accounting in government, and 
considered the possible motivation underpinning related decisions.  
In a study contrasting asset valuation practices of government departments in the state 
of Victoria and reporting entities in the private sector Carlin (2005) finds that, among 
public sector entities, depreciation charges as a proportion of total expense were higher 
than that observed for the private sector sample. Among a series of postulates, Carlin 
hypothesises that the Victorian government’s agenda could serve as a form of 
outsourcing (or privatisation) by stealth, because the accrual accounting assumptions 
systematically inflate public sector output costs when compared against private sector 
alternatives. 
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Barton (2009) makes the case for two interrelated factors. First is the adoption of a 
largely irrelevant business model of accrual accounting rather than one designed to suit 
public sector needs. Second, a political ideology (as expounded in public choice theory) 
that advocates downsizing the government and the marketisation of its activities. He 
further observes that there are some major problems to be resolved in the application of 
accrual accounting to the assets used in some areas unique to the public sector. These 
include many infrastructure, heritage, cultural and environmental assets, and land under 
roads. ‘Meaningful and reliable financial valuations may not be obtainable for these 
items or be relevant for their good management’ (p. 230). Specifically, there are 
difficult problems in valuing those public sector assets which do not have private sector 
counterparts, such as community assets, and which are not used for revenue generating 
purposes. 
An early study into asset measurement rules in Australia concluded that the public 
sector's adoption of current cost measurement rules may arise from a wish for the 
continued existence of a substantial public sector (Carlin, 2000), in contrast to a desire 
for a better model of measurement and financial reporting. Carlin also argues that the 
significance of measurement choices in the public sector extends beyond the appearance 
and composition of public-sector financial statements, and may have significant 
implications for contracting and outsourcing choices (Carlin, 2005). 
Carlin (2000) finds that Asset Revaluation Reserves as a percentage of both total and 
net assets are significantly lower for a sample of private-sector entities than for a sample 
of public-sector agencies, suggesting that there is a far higher reliance on historical cost 
accounting for private-sector entities. Carlin argues that the private sector had not 
embraced current cost accounting for two reasons. First, there was no significant 
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taxation benefits accrued to adopters of current cost accounting in Australiaii. Second, 
inflating their asset base under current cost accounting would negatively impact on 
return on asset ratio. 
The adoption of replacement cost valuation methodologies by public sector entities has 
had the effect of inflating the size of the balance sheets of public sector entities when 
compared against their private sector counterparts. As noted above, Carlin (2005) finds 
that depreciation charges as a proportion of total expense was higher for the former. He 
concludes that inflationary asset valuation techniques may have led to increased accrual 
charges against the operating statements of Victorian public sector agencies and 
potentially higher assessed cost of output production. Inflating their balance sheets by 
adopting replacement cost valuation methodologies could have a direct impact on a 
variety of resource allocation decisions, including those relating to outsourcing by 
government departments. 
The final, and potentially most contentious, issue in financial reporting by public sector 
entities relates to the measurement and recognition of infrastructure assets (Walker et 
al., 1999; Walker et al., 2004; Pilcher, 2005, 2006, 2009; Walker and Jones, 2012) and 
assets used for cultural, heritage and community purposes (Barton, 2000; Barton, 2005; 
Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008; Christiaens and Rommel, 2008; Financial Reporting 
Council, 2012; Aversano and Christiaens, 2014). These are asset categories that are 
largely unique to the public sector.  
While LGA reporting practices suggest that there could be some anomalies and 
uncertainties surrounding the rating of physical condition of infrastructure assets, 
Walker, Clarke, and Dean (1999) conclude that these statutory disclosures provided by 
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NSW local government are informative and more relevant to external stakeholders and 
those responsible for asset management in local government. Separately Pilcher (2005) 
finds that up to 98 per cent of LGAs recorded an error in depreciation of some 
component of transport infrastructure assets during 1999‐2000 and 2002‐2003. In a later 
study, Walker and Jones (2012) report that respondents from telephone and mail 
surveys, irrespective of their organizational affiliation or professional background, 
overwhelmingly preferred information about the physical condition of assets, combined 
with estimates of the current cost of bringing those assets to a satisfactory condition. 
Another recent local government infrastructure audit report (NSW Premier and Cabinet, 
2013) concludes that while the highest incidence of assets that are unable to provide a 
service were in buildings, bridges, and stormwater drainage, councils appear to have 
better asset management practices and processes in place for roads and related assets, 
water supply, and sewer networks. 
Heritage, cultural, recreational and environmental facilities and properties are normally 
preserved and maintained in good condition for the benefit of current and future 
generations, and they cannot be sold at will by the reporting entity. Their benefits are 
wholly or largely social in nature. As such the assets could be labelled as social assets, 
in contrast to the less tangible concept of social capital. One may view social assets to 
be held in trust for citizens by the government as trustee manager (Barton, 1999). The 
benefits associated with social assets generally flow to citizens rather than the 
government. 
Subsequent to Carnegie and Wolnizer (1995), Pallot (1997), Carnegie and Wolnizer 
(1999), and Barton (2000, 2005), Aversano and Christiaens (2014) address the issue of 
accounting for heritage facilities, which elsewhere are referred to as social assets or 
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community assets. Heritage assets differ from other kinds of assets in the value they 
derive from being impossible to reproduce and substitute, and are highly unlikely to be 
traded. Such elements are very difficult to handle within a normal accounting system 
designed for manager of an entity that provides economic services. In brief, they are 
maintained by the government for cultural, heritage, recreation and other community 
purposes rather than for the purpose of income generation. In IPSAS 17 Property, Plant 
and Equipment (International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board), ‘heritage 
assets’ are described as assets having cultural, environmental or historical significance. 
This standard does not require or prohibit their recognition. However, in case a 
government decides to disclose heritage assets in its financial statements, a number of 
disclosure requirements (in paragraphs 88 to 94) are prescribed by IPSAS 17 such as the 
basis of measurement, the depreciation method adopted, if any, and a reconciliation of 
the carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period showing certain components 
thereof. 
In summary, earlier research has demonstrated that financial reporting in the public 
sector is problematised along a number of dimensions which are not present in the for-
profit sector: the applicability of for-profit accounting for non-profits; the nature of 
users and their needs; the diverse motivations surrounding government entities, 
compared to the profit-focus of business entities; and the presence of unique asset and 
transaction types. In spite of problematisation of the sector along these dimensions, 
there is nonetheless some residual focus on performance, as explicated by Bradbury and 
Scott’s (2015) electoral study. 
With regard to the regulatory environment of LGAs in NSW, AAS 27 Financial 
Reporting by Local Governments (subsequently amended by AAS 27A, AASB 1045) 
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requires that local government authorities ascertain the value of land underneath roads 
in their jurisdiction, undertake a valuation and recognise the asset in each period’s 
statement of financial position. The issues under consideration here are whether this 
substantial social value to the community can be automatically translated into financial 
values; and if so, should they be treated as assets of the government for its general 
purpose financial reports. 
In AASB 1051 Land under Roads (2007), land under roads comprises land under 
roadways, and road reserves, including land under footpaths, nature strips and median 
strips. In this regard AASB 1051 is applicable to LGAs, which have control of such 
land within their boundaries. LGAs in NSW include and disclose such land as 
Community Land in their Notes to the financial statements, in contrast to other 
operating land, which is valued separately. 
Under the Local Government Act (NSW) 1993 and regulations governing statutory 
reporting, LGAs are required to disclose performance benchmarks relating to services 
they provided for the fiscal year (1 July – 30 June). In regard to financial reporting, the 
Local Government Code of Accounting Practice and Financial Reporting (NSW Office 
of Local Government, 2016 and prior years) provides guidelines on the disclosure of 
specific items in the financial statements and in the Notes to the financial statements. 
The Code provides and requires pro-forma financial statements and Notes that are to be 
strictly adhered to by LGAs. In addition, NSW Office of Local Government (previously 
NSW Depart of Local Government) issues frequent updates in the form of “Circular to 
Councils.” For instance, Department of Local Government Circular to Councils 09-09 
(2009) advised LGAs that the valuation of community land in terms of Australian 
Accounting Standard AASB 116, Property Plant and Equipment, was to be deferred 
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until 30 June 2011 and that the NSW Valuer General’s valuations may be used under 
the revaluation model to represent fair value for the revaluation of community land 
under clause 31 of AASB 116iii. 
Given the partial similarity in motivations between business and government, together 
with unique aspects of the public sector, we therefore explore whether LGA reporting 
behaviour is driven by conventional agency incentives and unique government-sector 
incentives. We aim to provide an explanation for the valuation and subsequent 
revaluation of local infrastructure assets at fair value, excluding heritage assets, by local 
government authorities.  
3. Hypothesis Development and Research Method 
Prior studies that surveyed the actual users of specific reports (Coy et al., 1997; Clark, 
2002; Mack and Ryan, 2006) found that internal users, namely those having a role in the 
management, operation or governance of the entities, were more predominant than 
external users. In the context of local government authorities, job mobility of 
management and other employees is much enhanced when employees in one section 
within a local government authority is well informed of the activity undertaken by other 
sections. Likewise inter-entity job mobility and opportunity are vastly improved when 
information on activity and performance of each section is disclosed. From the local 
government’s perspective, such disclosure provides useful information in attracting 
outside talents to the employ of the local government authority. 
With regard to external users of local government annual reports, Priest et al. (1999) 
surveyed ratepayers, apart from business people and service providers (contractors) 
engaged by a local government, as users of annual reports. For our study, we focus on 
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service contractors as the major user group who could be expected to be interested in 
specific information disclosed in the annual report such as local government’s Materials 
and Contract expense, and Contracts Awarded above a threshold (disclosing the 
winning contractors and the amounts awarded for the fiscal year). We argue that service 
contractors are interested in the pattern of outsourcing and the scale and scope of a local 
government’s activity since such information is useful to the contractors in projecting 
their future contract opportunities with the local government and State authorities. 
These outsourcing activities would include road and building work maintenance, 
development, construction and other related extension works. 
It is essential to clarify that, in our exploratory context, hypotheses are specified in order 
to provide an investigative frame. Given the paucity of research into incentives in local 
government, we do not posit them as forcefully as would be done in a for-profit context.  
3.1 Asset Revaluation from an Efficient Contracting Perspective 
In line with the efficient contracting perspective (Holthausen, 1990; Emanuel et al., 
2003), we pose that the valuation and subsequent revaluation of Community Assets and 
the disclosure of major contracts awarded by local government authorities minimise 
agency costs amongst several interested parties, namely the local government 
management, the service contractors, and supervisory agencies. First, the range and 
scope of future outsourced projects published by an LGA can be gauged and 
extrapolated from existing Community Assets under a local government’s jurisdiction. 
More contractor bids for each project serve to make the bidding process more 
competitive and afford more options for the authority. Second, for a given project, the 
service contractors would be able to submit a realistic bid price based on similar past 
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valuations of a community asset and past contracts awarded. Third, supervisory and 
investigative agencies such as the Office of Local Government (NSW) and the 
Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) would welcome more direct 
monitoring by the public and others advocating greater scrutiny and transparency in 
local government reporting with regard to the tendering and awarding of contracts by 
local government entities for outsourced services. In summary, the efficient contracting 
framework yields the following hypotheses: 
H1a: Asset revaluation of community land by local government entities are 
positively related to the service contracts awarded. 
H1b: Asset revaluation of infrastructure (community) assets by local 
government entities are positively related to the service contracts 
awarded. 
H1c: Asset revaluation of community land by local government entities are 
positively related to the materials and service contract expense. 
H1d: Asset revaluation of infrastructure (community) assets by local 
government entities are positively related to the materials and service 
contract expense. 
Under the Local Government Act (NSW) 1993 and regulations governing statutory 
reporting, local government entities are required to disclose Service Contracts Awarded 
above threshold (commonly $150,000). Further, Local Government Code of Accounting 
Practice and Financial Reporting (NSW) provide guidelines on the disclosure of specific 
items in the financial statements and in the Notes to the financial statements of local 
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government entities, including Depreciation, Amortisation & Impairment under Note 
4(d). 
Community Assets comprise Community Land and local Infrastructure (Community) 
Assets. Our definition of Community Assets is much narrower than that of Barton’s 
(2000) in that we specifically exclude heritage and cultural assets. We exclude such 
items for two reasons. First, the concern over heritage asset valuation and recognition 
(Barton, 2000) involving larger structures and environment is unlikely to be relevant in 
the context of our study. A local government entity is not the appropriate depository to 
be entrusted with the management of such specialised (and often massive) assets. 
Second, ‘Heritage Collections’ held by a local government entity are incidental and 
immaterial relative to its major operating assets. We further exclude operational land 
and other operational items such as minor Plant and Equipment, office equipment, 
furniture and fittings, and non-specialised buildings as such common assets can be 
disposed of or replaced at the discretion of a local government authority in the same 
manner had they been under the control of any business entity. As in the case of 
Heritage Collections, such operational assets held by a local government entity are 
immaterial relative to its major operational community assets. 
The definitions and measurements relating to the variables in the above hypotheses are 
as follows: 
Community Land comprises public parks, playgrounds, sports grounds, and Land under 
Roads. Local government entities recognise and disclose community land at fair value 
(and not at cost) at end of each reporting period. Land under Roads comprises land 
under roadways, and road reserves, including land under footpaths, nature strips and 
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median strips. Land under Roads is thus a sub-category of Community Land, but not 
separately disclosed by local government entities in the Notes to their financial 
statements. As valuation and revaluation of land under roads are not separately 
disclosed, we adopt the broader measure of community land for our tests. 
Infrastructure Community Assets consist of road surfaces, bridges, footpaths, 
stormwater drainage, swimming pools and other recreational assets. Local government 
entities also recognise and disclose their infrastructure community assets at fair value 
(and not at cost) at end of each reporting period. 
Service Contracts Awarded disclosure by local councils in their annual reports is a 
statutory requirement under Local Government Code of Accounting Practice and 
Financial Reporting (NSW). The dollar amount of each contract is disclosed, as well as 
the identity of the winning contract bidder. 
Materials and Contract Expense is disclosed by local councils as a separate line item in 
their operating statement and further details are provided in the Notes to the financial 
statements. 
Community land revaluation is measured as the difference between two successive 
years’ carrying values of community land, excluding any addition and disposal.  
Infrastructure community assets revaluation is likewise the difference between two 
successive years’ carrying values of infrastructure community assets, excluding any 
addition/disposal, transfer in/out, and depreciation for the fiscal year. 
Hypothesis 1 is tested by estimation of the following models: 
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𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1) 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (2) 
where: 
SCA = Service Contracts Awarded 
MCE = Materials and Contract Expense 
COMMLANDREVAL = amount of Community Land Revaluation 
COMMLAND = balance of Community Land 
ICAREVAL = amount of Infrastructure Community Assets 
Revaluation 
ICA = balance of Infrastructure Community Assets 
The existence of effects hypothesised exists if β1 and β3 coefficients are significant. The 
structure of the models, in the context of signalling contracting opportunities, reflects 
the ability of revaluation to flow through into the award of greater amounts of external 
contracts by dollar quantum above the reporting threshold (SCA) and in total (MCE). 
We acknowledge that the existence of other users of financial reports, such as internal 
users and regulatory agencies, may bias against finding confirmatory results, potentially 
yielding less significant results. 
Note that this model is a simplified model. As is apparent in our results section, we 
introduce lagged effects on the right hand side of the model. We do this because it is 
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difficult to assert unequivocally that financial information in a given period is used to 
make decisions about outsourcing or bidding for contracts immediately. Indeed, it is 
more likely that the information effect takes some time to percolate out of the entity to 
information users. 
3.2 Asset Revaluation and Opportunistic Incentives 
An alternative to efficient contracting explanation of the valuation and revaluation 
practices of community assets by local government is that of opportunistic behaviour in 
accounting choice. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) advocate however that in future ‘the 
empirical tests can no longer assume accounting choice is made for either efficiency or 
opportunistic reasons. Both must be incorporated into the tests.’ By contrast, Emanuel et 
al. (2003) argue that ‘even if an accounting choice appears to be opportunistic or is 
indeed purely opportunistic, we can still view accounting as an efficient contracting 
technology’ (p. 163). To some degree opportunism will exist, but one could not dismiss 
accounting systems and accounting choices as having not been developed from an 
efficient contracting framework. It is well accepted the thrust of the institutional 
economics literature is that of efficiency, and ‘it would be inconceivable to generate any 
kind of accounting theory without fitting it within that efficiency framework’ (p.163). 
Based on the foregoing observations of Watts and Zimmerman (1990) and Emanuel et 
al. (2003), we seek to test if remuneration rewards incentivise management of local 
government entities to opportunistically value and subsequently revalue Community 
Land and local infrastructure assets at fair value. 
H2a: Management remunerations incentivise community land revaluation at 
fair value by local government entities. 
21 
H2b: Management remunerations incentivise infrastructure community assets 
revaluation by local government entities. 
We acknowledge that any test of agency incentives will be a joint test of those 
incentives and of other (omitted variable) effects. To tease out such effects would 
require much larger datasets than we have available for this study, and so our results 
will need to be interpreted bearing in mind this impediment to internal validity. 
In each of the above hypotheses, we estimate multivariate (fixed effects) OLS 
regressions using the following empirical models: 
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (3) 
𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (4) 
where: 
CEO_REMUN = CEO total remuneration 
MGT_REMUN = total remuneration paid to the entire management team 
(including the CEO).  
The lagged effect reflects the causal direction of the relation, wherein a management 
team seeks to undertake a revaluation in anticipation of being able to (in future) derive 
an enhanced remuneration package. 
Local government entities are required to disclose the CEO remuneration and Senior 
Staff remuneration under the Local Government Act (NSW) 1993 and regulations 
governing statutory reporting. The Senior Staff remuneration is generally not disclosed 
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individually, but disclosed collectively as a group. The remuneration reported includes 
the manager’s superannuation, bonuses, and all other benefits. 
3.3 Asset Revaluation and Operating/Capital Grants  
There are many regional development projects that are beyond the financial resources of 
LGAs’ internal sources of income, chiefly from Rates revenue (local tax) and service-
based fees. A major external source of income for many LGAs is Operating/Capital 
Grants funded by the Federal Government and administered by the State Government 
through a Local Government Grants Commission (2015). In 2013 the New South Wales 
Treasury Corporation (TCorp) undertook a comprehensive review of the financial 
sustainability of NSW local government sector. Among its major findings is that 
councils' deteriorating financial performance had been occurring for some time and this 
had led to a gradual weakening of the local government sector. The future sustainability 
of Councils is dependent upon generating sufficient funds to meet the costs of 
maintaining and renewing assets to deliver services. 
With regard to local government infrastructure assets, TCorp (2013) identified two key 
issues of utmost concern. First, an asset maintenance gap exists, namely an annual 
shortfall in spending on asset maintenance has persisted in recent years. Second, there 
exists a continuing and substantial Infrastructure Backlog across all Councils. TCorp 
concluded that these factors together with councils' worsening financial performance, if 
not corrected, will lead to further deteriorating financial strength and ultimately a lower 
quality of assets and hence services that can be delivered by the sector.  
Assets embody future benefits, and in the context of local government infrastructure 
assets, the future benefits are the services that a local government is expected to deliver 
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to its community. In line with their obligations to maintain and enhance infrastructure 
assets to provide the expected level of service to the community, we posit that asset 
revaluations are a means by which LGAs seek to explicate their needs for additional 
funding and to attract Operating/Capital Grants from the NSW Local Government 
Grants Commission. However, there are specific circumstances wherein capital grants 
could be awarded on the basis of emergency, such as the needs occasioned by property 
losses from bush fires and floods, which would trigger downward revaluation of 
assets.iv  
H3a: Government Grants incentivise community land revaluation by local 
government entities. 
H3b: Government Grants incentivise infrastructure community assets 
revaluation by local government entities. 
We test these relations by estimating the following models: 
𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (5) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (6) 
where: 
OPGRANT = Total Operating Grants received by the LGA during the year 
CAPGRANT = Total Capital Grants received by the LGA during the year 
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3.4 Testing for Government Entities’ Propensity to Outsource 
We also seek to test findings by Carlin (2005) that among the Victorian government’s 
public sector entities, depreciation charges as a proportion of total expense were higher 
than that observed for the private sector sample. Carlin (2005) concludes that the 
Victorian government’s agenda could serve as a form of outsourcing (or privatisation) 
by stealth, because the accrual accounting assumptions systematically inflate public 
sector output costs when compared against private sector alternatives. We reason that if 
a high ratio for depreciation charges as a proportion of total expense is indicative of a 
not-for-profit public sector entity’s agenda to outsource, there exists a positive 
correlation between a high ratio for depreciation charges as a proportion of total 
expense and the value of the service contracts awarded by a public sector entity.  
H4a: Depreciation charges as a proportion of total expense of local 
government entities are positively related to the service contracts 
awarded. 
In an earlier study, Carlin (2000) finds that Asset Revaluation Reserves as a percentage 
of both total and net assets are significantly lower for the sample of private-sector 
entities than for the sample of public-sector agencies, suggesting that there is a far 
higher reliance on historical cost accounting for private-sector entities. He falls short 
however of charging the public sector and government with having an agenda of 
outsourcing (or privatisation) by stealth. Nonetheless Carlin’s (2000) finding, while 
precedes, also resonates with the tenor of his later study (Carlin, 2005).  We seek to 
extend Carlin’s (2000) finding and examine if Asset Revaluation Reserves as a 
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percentage of local government entity’s total assets are correlated with service contracts 
awarded. 
H4b: Asset Revaluation Reserves as a proportion of local government entity’s 
total assets are positively related to the service contracts awarded. 
Hypothesis 4 is tested by estimating the following models: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶_𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (7) 
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (8) 
where: 
DEPN_TE = Depreciation charges as a proportion of total expense 
ARR_TA = Asset Revaluation Reserves as a percentage of total assets 
Depreciation charges, total expense, total assets, service contracts awarded, and asset 
revaluation reserves are extracted directly from a council’s financial statements. 
3.5 Data and Method 
We collected data spanning eight years (2008-2015) from the top quartile of 152 
general-purpose local government councils in NSW ranked by their total assets as of 
June 2015. The final sample size was 43. The cut-off year of 2008 is chosen since 
subsequent to AASB 1051 Land under Roads applicable from 1 July 2008, local 
government entities (and State Roads and Traffic authorities) have the option to 
derecognise some or all of the carrying value of land under roads acquired prior to 1 
July 2008.  The tail end of the study period, namely 2015, lends itself readily since 
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major amalgamations among LGAs in NSW took place in 2016, which would render 
continuity and consistency of data problematic. 
The models described above are tested using regression techniques incorporating fixed 
effects for both ‘firms’ (i.e., local government authorities in the sample) and years. The 
logarithm of total assets (LogTotalAssets) is included as a control in each test. 
4. Results and Conclusions 
Table 1 reports the key descriptives. We note in particular that there are few Community 
Land Revaluations disclosed by the sample reporting entities. Correlations of key 
variables are presented in Table 2. 
4.1 Main tests 
We postulate in hypothesis 1 that revaluation of community land and infrastructure by 
Local Government Authorities (LGAs) is related to the extent of contracts awarded by 
LGAs. As the amount of such contracts necessarily undertaken is a function of the 
amount of assets under management, revaluation of such assets strengthens 
transparency by demonstrating the amount of assets which the LGA manages. 
Our results addressing Hypothesis 1 are shown in Tables 3 and 4. In Hypothesis 1, the 
postulated relationship involves the extent of revaluation of Community Land and of 
Infrastructure Assets in general. As noted above, few LGAs disclose separately the 
revaluation of Community Land component. For this reason, we report regressions 
estimated including and excluding the Community Land variables. When excluded, we 
obtain a larger number of observations with available data for all variables. 
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The regressions are estimated with fixed effects for LGAs and years. The key variables 
are COMMLANDREVAL (the change in the revaluation reserve for Community Land, 
where available) and ICAREVAL (the change in the revaluation reserve for total 
Infrastructure Assets).  The dependant variables are SCA (sum of Contracts Awarded 
over reportable threshold) and MCE (Materials Contracts and Expenses)v.  
These variables and the control variables are defined as follows: 
 
Variables standardised by Total Assets in testsvi: 
SCA = Total Sum of Contacts Awarded over the reporting threshold for LGAs 
($150,000) 
MCE = Materials and Contracts Expense for the current financial year, from the 
Income Statement 
MCP = Cash payments related to Materials and Contracts 
Expense for the current financial year, from the 
Statement of Cash Flows 
COMMLANDREVAL = the net change in any revaluation reserve relating to 
Community Land 
COMMLANDREVAL_t1  = the net change in any revaluation reserve relating to 
Community Land lagged one period 
COMMLAND_t1 = Community Land balance at the start of the financial 
year 
COMMLAND_t2  = Community Land balance lagged one period 
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ICAREVAL = the net change in the revaluation reserve relating to 
Infrastructure Assets 
ICAREVAL_t1 = the net change in the revaluation reserve relating to 
Infrastructure Assets lagged one period 
ICA_t1 = Infrastructure Assets at the start of the financial year 
ICA_t2 = Infrastructure Assets lagged one period 
CFOnet = Net operating cash flows of the current year from the 
Statement of Cash Flows 
Employee Expenses = Employee Related Expenses from the Income 
Statement 
EquityTotal = Net assets of the LGA 
RevenueBudgeted = Revenue budgeted by the LGA for the current period 
RevenueTotal = Total Revenue of the LGA for the current period 
Variables not standardised by Total Assets: 
NoEmployees = Number of full time equivalent employees of LGA 
at end of the year 
Population = Population of LGA in the given year (from 
Australian Bureau of Statistics)  
PopPerEmp = Population divided by Number of Employees 
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From Table 3, we see that there is no relationship between revaluations of either 
Community Land or Infrastructure Assets for LGAs that report both of these items. 
However, when the sample is extended by not requiring the Community Land variables 
to be present, we do find a significant positive effect (p<0.10) of Infrastructure 
revaluations on MCE (Materials and Contracts Expense). This contemporaneous 
relationshipvii suggests that the presence of higher maintenance costs could be 
interpreted as the LGA managing a larger quantum of assets (perhaps as a prelude to 
seeking additional funding).  No effect however is detected on the quantum of contracts 
awarded, suggesting only partial support for H1. Since contracts awarded and MCE are 
essentially capturing the same phenomenon, we suspect that the difference may be due 
to the incompleteness of the former, as SCA only captures outsourcing above a 
threshold, whereas MCE captures total spending. 
It is possible that the relationship between revaluations on the one hand, and awarding 
contracts on the other, is one that involves some delay. For example, an LGA may feel 
more comfortable in awarding the relevant number of contracts once its need for them 
has been clearly demonstrated by a set of published financial statements, making public 
a more appropriate valuation of the assets under management.  
Accordingly, in Table 4 we report the results of introducing two lagged revaluation 
variables (COMMLANDREVAL_t1 and ICAREVAL_t1) and the related opening-balance 
controls (COMMLAND_t2 and ICA_t2).  We observe a negative relationship between 
MCE and Community Land revaluations only for the lagged measure (p=0.011), while 
only the lagged version of ICAREVAL has a positive coefficient (p=0.013).  
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In summary, therefore, our hypothesis 1 regarding  a relationship between disclosure of 
fair values through the revaluation process and the amount of expenditure related to 
those assets (SCA, MCE) is – at best (the coefficient on ICAREVAL in Table 3) – only 
supported very tenuously, in limited circumstances.  
In hypothesis 2, we postulate a relation between revaluation activity and the 
remuneration of top management: CEO_REMUN, measuring the remuneration of the 
CEO (howsoever described) and MGT_REMUN, measuring the total remuneration of 
management. Similarly to our test of Hypothesis 1, we estimate fixed effects models 
over both the restricted sample requiring non-missing Community Land revaluation, 
and over a larger sample without this restriction. The results, tabulated in Table 5, 
indicate no relationship whatsoever between revaluations and either remuneration 
variable. Table 6, reporting regressions estimated using lagged revaluations, similarly 
finds no response except for a negative one with lagged Community Land revaluations, 
for the small subsample containing these. 
Our main evidence is consistent with their being no relation between revaluation 
activity and management remuneration. In other words, the ability to derive higher 
remuneration does not appear to be a driver of revaluation activity. A plausible 
explanation for absence of correlation is that the remuneration of the CEO and senior 
executives of LGAs are largely determined by an independent government Tribunal, 
and the narrow range within each level of remuneration is not sufficiently substantial to 
be a driver for asset revaluation. 
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It is clear, from the above, that revaluation in Local Government reporting entities is not 
driven by the usual motivations which are attributed by agency theory to accounting 
activities in the private sector. 
One of the main stakeholders in local government is the granting agencies of state 
government. We posit in hypothesis 3 a relationship between revaluation behaviour and 
the quanta of capital and operating grants respectively. Table 7 reports estimations of 
explanatory effects of the various revaluation variables on both of these grant types. In 
columns (1) and (2) we report the results for Operating and Capital grants respectively 
for the subsample including Community Land revaluations. In the remaining columns 
we drop the restrictions that these revaluations need to be present, and introduce a lag of 
Infrastructure Asset revaluations. We find significant results in only one of these 
models: for the subsample of Community Land revaluers, there is a strong negative 
association (p<0.01) between Capital Grants and Community Land Revaluations, and a 
strong positive association (p<0.01) between Infrastructure Asset revaluations and 
Capital Grants.  
Particularly intriguing is that these results do not hold across the larger sample. The 
councils undertaking revaluations of Community Land (with the exception of two LGA-
years) are all in the Sydney metropolitan area. Given that these are councils likely to 
have highly valuable infrastructure and community land, the relationship with 
Community Land is unsurprising (land as such does not require much capital 
maintenance). In contrast, highly valuable infrastructure is likely to require costly 
development, and so its value (or revalued ‘value’) is more likely to constitute a salient 
signal to granting agencies. 
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In hypothesis 4, we examine an alternative motivation for accounting behaviour in 
LGAs: that high depreciation expenses and high revaluation reserves provide an excuse 
to outsource.  Table 8 Panel A reports the results of three regressions using 
contemporaneous measures: DEPN_TE (depreciation as a proportion of total expenses) 
against SCA, ARR_TA (Asset Revaluation Reserve as a proportion of total assets) 
against SCA, and SCA against both DEPN_TE and ARR_TA. Although no relationship 
obtains on DEPN_TE, a relationship between ARR_TA and SCA_TA is dependent on 
the structure of the model. When regressing outsourcing (SCA_TA) against cumulative 
revaluation (ARR_TA) and controls, no result obtains (column 3). However, when the 
controls are used to remove variation in ARR_TA rather than SCA_TA (column 2), a 
strong positive relationship occurs, suggesting that service contracts are associated with 
the extent of revaluations.  
Note that these results implicitly assume that signalling (accounting) and response 
(outsourcing) happen almost concurrently.  It is possible that the effect is delayed. 
Accordingly, in Table 8 Panel B we report the relation between SCA and one-period 
lagged values of direct revaluation measures. Similar to Panel A, we continue to 
observe the absence of any relationship between contacts awarded and (in this case, 
lagged) values of depreciation and Asset Revaluation Reserve.  In addition, regressing 
ARR_TA against lagged SCA (not reported; similar to Table 8, Panel A, column 2) also 
yields no significant relation. 
Overall, therefore, we find some evidence for a relationship between revaluations and 
service contracts awarded, but only when concurrent measures of these variables are 
examined. In order to assert a causal relationship, we would expect a lagged relationship 
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between revaluation and SCA_TA. The absence of such a relationship prevents us from 
concluding any causal relationship 
 
4.2 Robustness and the effect of Size 
To test our results for robustness, we also estimated fixed effects models: 
• with all variables raw (rather than standardised by Total Assets) for the 
LGA/year; 
• with all variables standardised by Total Assets for the LGA/year, also including 
the raw total assets as a size control; 
• with all variables standardised by Total Assets as above, but also including 
lagged revaluation from the previous two years (rather than one year); and 
• with all variables standardised by Total Assets as above with the raw total assets 
as a size control and winsorising all variables at both 1% and 10% 
Our basic results are qualitatively representative of robustness tests undertaken. Thus, 
we conclude that there is no systematic relationship between revaluation and 
management compensation and contracts awarded (whether measured by Materials 
Contracts Expense or Sum of Contracts Awarded). 
Generally, if a strong effect exists, a linear model is likely to find it. However, if there 
are non-linearities in the economic relationship, a linear model may well obstruct its 
presence. Local Government Authorities in New South Wales are quite different in size. 
In our sample, the top LGA is roughly a factor of 10 larger (by total assets) than the 
lowest LGA. It is likely that incentives and organisational culture will vary substantially 
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between large and small LGAs. If in fact there is a size difference, it would be detected 
by examining the extrema of our sample. Accordingly, we split our entire data set into 
quartiles (by total assets in the given LGA/year), discard the second and third quartile, 
and re-run the basic tests for the top and bottom quartiles. 
The results (using winsorised variables) are reported in Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12.  In 
relation to hypotheses 1 and 2, we find: 
• a significant positive coefficient on unlagged Infrastructure revaluation 
(ICAREVAL) on Materials Contracts Expense (MCE) in large LGAs (Table 9, 
Panel B, p<0.05); 
• a significant positive coefficient on 1-year lagged Infrastructure revaluation 
(ICAREVAL_t1) on Management remuneration (MGT_REMUN) in large LGAs 
(Table 10, Panel B, p<0.01); 
Clearly, support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 is present but not pervasive.  
Table 11 reports the determinants of grants by quartile. Except for a weak positive 
relation between current year revaluations of infrastructure (ICAREVAL) and Capital 
Grants (Table 11, Panel A, p<0.10) for small LGAs, there is no other effect. This 
indicates that there is some relationship between revaluations and capital grants, but this 
effect is contemporaneous, and so attribution of causality would be difficult, especially 
in the absence of any significance on the lagged variable. 
For hypothesis 4, Table 12 reveals weak evidence for a significant positive relationship 
between SCA (standardised by Total Assets, SCA_TA) and the percentage of Total 
Expenses constituted by depreciation (DEPN_TE), for just the top quartile of LGAs by 
total assets. However, this is marginally significant (p=0.052) only in the case where the 
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dependant variable is depreciation but not where SCA is the dependent variable. This 
suggests that the effect, if any, is quite weak. 
That the relationship between SCA, depreciation and revaluation is sensitive to model 
structure (Table 8) and winsorisation (Table 12) suggests that there is no systematic 
relationship. For example, the absence of any relationship between revaluation and SCA 
after winsorisation suggests that the winsorised extrema are likely driving any 
relationship, rather than it subsisting through the entire dataset. Accordingly, we cannot 
conclude that there is no systematic relationship between depreciation and revaluation 
in the one hand, and SCA on the other. 
4.3 Conclusions and Limitations 
We examine an implication of applying IFRS to the public sector in Australia, positing 
both a self-interest and a transparency motivation for local governments undertaking 
revaluations of both Infrastructure Assets and Community Land.  
The self-interest motivation was expected to manifest as a relationship between the 
amount of revaluation and CEO (or management team) remuneration. We theorised that 
increased measures of assets under management, whether in terms of revaluation 
increases, or as quantum of ongoing depreciation, may be an underpinning rationale for 
justifying higher pay for the CEO in particular, or management team in general. 
Similarly, we posited that revaluations of assets would provide a signal to funding 
sources (i.e., state governments) that a substantial amount of assets required greater 
capital grants for asset enhancement. 
The transparency motivation was expected to result in a relationship between 
revaluation and the extent of spending on these assets, measured as both quantum of 
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Materials and Contracts Expense, and as the quantum of contracts awarded by the entity 
above the disclosure threshold. Under this motivation, we argue that local government 
entities have an informational incentive to mark assets to fair value. By marking assets 
to fair value, they are able to justify the extent of spending incurred and contracts issued 
in relation to the ongoing operation of those assets. 
At conventional levels of significance, we find no pervasive support for these 
relationships, suggesting that motivations at the local government level are either more 
subtle or non-existent. The lack of significant relationships is not however inconsistent 
with findings in Mack and Ryan (2006) and Coy et al. (1997). Mack and Ryan’s 
evidence, drawn from a survey of actual users of government department general 
purpose financial reports, suggests that general-purpose financial reports are used to 
satisfy financial accountability and public accountability rather than decision making. 
Our results, within our empirical context, are supportive of the lack of motivation 
“contamination” of this reporting process.  
Using a survey of annual report recipients, Coy et al. (1997) conclude that evidence 
from the NZ tertiary education sector suggests that internal and within-industry users 
are more active users of annual reports than external recipients. As the local government 
authorities in our study follow a reporting framework and standardised accounting 
procedures prescribed by the State government (in compliance with applicable 
AASB/IFRS standards), financial and public accountabilities are likely to be a driver for 
the valuation and subsequent revaluation of local infrastructure assets at fair value. Thus 
our findings – that asset revaluations do not appear to be motivated by opportunistic 
self-interest – lends support to the suitability of the financial reporting framework for 
local government governance. 
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The implications of our study are restricted to the local government context. Data 
constraints, including sample sizes, do not allow the testing of complex interplays of 
incentives. Nonetheless, within this limitation, this study contributes to documenting 




                                                          
i  Bradbury and Scott (2015) find in New Zealand that ratepayers are likely to use 
secondary sources. 
ii This comment by Carlin of course ignores the point that financial reporting 
decisions do not necessarily have any impact on tax reporting outcomes, given 
the quite distinct nature of financial accounting and tax accounting. 
iii  A reviewer suggested that our hypotheses may lack support due to other 
incentives or regulatory changes. In relation to the first issue, our sample size 
restricts the extent of interactions (and institutional nuances) able to be modelled 
within the context of NSW Local government.  We acknowledge, therefore, that 
our tests are essentially joint tests with the effects of omitted variables. Given 
these sample constraints, this research should be read as documenting 
behaviours, even though – for framing purposes – we express this as hypothesis 
testing. 
 In relation to the second issue, we considered whether the extent of revaluations 
had changed around the 2011 fair value implementation year regulated by the 
2009 DLG Circular to Councils 09-09, requiring councils to value assets at fair 
value from 2011. A comparison of mean revaluations for community land, 
infrastructure and total revaluation reserve change (not reported) did not show 
any evidence of significant differences before/after 2011.  
iv  We acknowledge suggestion from a reviewer to this aspect of potential 
downward revaluation. 
39 
                                                                                                                                                                          
v As a robustness check, we also test Materials Contract Payments, which is the 
amount of cash payments made in relation to Materials Contracts and Expenses. 
As the results are qualitatively the same as for Materials Contracts and 
Expenses, they are not reported. 
vi Our tests use versions of these variables standardised by Total Assets, identified 
in our results tables by appending a suffix of “_TA”. For clarity, we generally 
omit the suffix in our discussion. 
vii  A reviewer also suggested that perhaps our failure to find contemporaneous 
results may be due to LGAs being on a “revaluation treadmill”. We investigated 
(results not tabulated) whether there was any time series relationship between 
successive revaluations, both for community land and for infrastructure assets, 
as well as for total revaluation. Except for a negative correlation between 
community land revaluation and its one-year lag, no relationship existed. In 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Descriptives (raw variables, not winsorised) 









ARR_total 611,003,250 24,917,000 245,777,500 419,858,000 692,060,000 4,468,194,000 705,677,664 
CFOnet 37,150,241 3,296,000 19,116,000 30,083,500 42,390,500 434,544,000 34,859,716 
COMMLANDREVAL 63,968,312 -2,484,337,920 0 0 0 2,432,965,120 590,187,896 
COMMLANDREVAL_t1 48,379,461 -2,484,337,920 0 0 0 2,432,965,120 608,414,148 
COMMLAND_t1 430,729,561 4,429,000 39,977,000 129,685,000 391,977,984 3,784,121,088 714,067,878 
COMMLAND_t2 436,017,718 4,429,000 37,217,000 132,258,000 415,392,000 3,784,121,088 713,187,881 
DEPN_TE 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
EmployeeExpenses 45,359,724 827,000 27,415,500 38,953,000 54,530,000 203,711,000 27,867,706 
EquityTotal 1,674,261,476 1,700,884 969,436,500 1,404,514,500 2,099,760,000 7,618,770,000 1,092,346,052 
ICAREVAL 1,391,041,146 -2,484,337,920 101,388 36,891,000 118,799,500 251,753,005,056 16,850,225,917 
ICAREVAL_t1 741,954,798 -2,484,337,920 89,775 34,754,000 119,061,000 185,865,994,240 10,724,736,650 
ICA_t1 2,344,339,950 515,388,992 1,444,172,032 2,129,643,008 2,994,659,072 7,687,799,808 1,177,441,233 
ICA_t2 2,286,440,819 515,388,992 1,352,210,048 2,076,873,024 2,989,660,928 7,656,348,160 1,148,661,276 
LogTotalAssets 21.12 15.15 20.73 21.12 21.50 22.78 0.62 
MCE 29,234,172 10,153,000 20,528,500 25,871,500 34,566,000 105,542,000 13,837,454 
MCP 31,271,131 -26,168,000 20,741,500 28,313,500 37,994,500 118,070,000 15,545,019 
NoEmployees 570 246 359 503 674 1,804 294 
PopPerEmp 189 81 124 180 248 356 67 
Population 108,664 28,431 57,394 83,317 157,914 339,328 65,263 
RevenueBudgeted 128,626,267 42,687,000 81,814,500 106,685,500 150,011,000 1,004,999,000 88,479,576 
RevenueTotal 141,151,453 41,860,000 91,456,500 118,075,500 158,598,500 735,552,000 87,304,203 
SCA 26,586,845 0 7,268,736 16,220,000 36,094,720 189,356,944 30,032,144 
OpGrant 14,067,071 2,019,500 8,204,000 12,679,500 17,817,000 42,521,000 7,308,515 
CapGrant 22,205,708 5,517 6,931,500 12,877,000 23,427,500 687,720,000 43,719,358 
CEO_REMUN 298,477 170,000 254,354 285,431 327,660 793,307 72,960 
MGT_REMUN 874,054 0 586,233 806,036 959,807 4,029,939 594,602 
Note: Variables are raw, unwinsorised and not standardised by Total Assets. In the remaining tables, except where otherwise stated, variables 
standardised by Total Assets use the same names with suffix of “_TA”. Variables are: ARR_total: balance of total asset revaluation reserve at 
end of year; CFONET: Net operating cash flows of the current year from the Statement of Cash Flows; COMMLANDREVAL: the net change in 
any revaluation reserve relating to Community Land; COMMLANDREVAL_t1 : the net change in any revaluation reserve relating to Community 
Land lagged one period; COMMLAND_t1: Community Land balance at the start of the financial year; COMMLAND_t2: opening Community 
Land balance lagged one period; DEPN_TE: Depreciation charge as a proportion of total expenses; EmployeeExpenses: Employee Related 
Expenses from the Income Statement; EquityTotal: Net assets of the LGA; ICAREVAL: the net change in the revaluation reserve relating to 
Infrastructure Assets;  ICAREVAL_t1: the net change in the revaluation reserve relating to Infrastructure Assets lagged one period; ICA_t1: 
Infrastructure Assets at the start of the financial year;  ICA_t2: Infrastructure Assets lagged one period; LogTotalAssets: Total assets of the LGA 
at the end of the year; MCE: Materials and Contracts Expense for the current financial year, from the Income Statement; MCP: Cash payments 
related to Materials and Contracts Expense for the current financial year, from the Statement of Cash Flows; NoEmployees: number of full 
time equivalent employees of LGA at end of the year; Population: Population of LGA in the given year (from Australian Bureau of Statistics); 
PopPerEmp: Population divided by Number of Employees; RevenueBudgeted: Revenue budgeted by the LGA for the current period; 
RevenueTotal: Total Revenue of the LGA for the current period; SCA: Total Sum of Contacts Awarded over the reporting threshold for LGAs 
($150,000); OpGrant: Total Operating Grants received by the LGA during the year; CapGrant: Total Capital Grants received by the LGA during 
the year; CEO_REMUN: Total annual remuneration of the chief executive of the LGA; MGT_REMUN: Total annual remuneration of 
management of the LGA. 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
1 SCA_TA 1.00 
             
          
                
          
2 MCE_TA 1.00 1.00 
            
          
  
0.00 
             
          
3 MCP_TA 1.00 1.00 1.00 
           
          
  
0.00 0.00 
            
          
4 CEO_REMUN_TA 0.01 0.60 0.47 1.00 
          
          
  
-0.92 0.00 0.00 
           
          
5 MGT_REMUN_TA 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.55 1.00 
         
          
  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          
          
6 COMMLANDREVAL_TA 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.07 1.00 1.00 
        
          
  
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.63 0.00 
         
          
7 COMMLANDREVAL_t1_TA -0.07 -0.15 -0.16 0.07 0.20 -0.03 1.00 
       
          
  
-0.66 -0.33 -0.29 -0.66 -0.17 -0.87 
        
          
8 ICAREVAL_TA 0.98 0.99 0.99 -0.06 0.99 1.00 -0.02 1.00 
      
          
  
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.28 0.00 0.00 -0.89 
       
          
9 ICAREVAL_t1_TA -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.14 0.95 0.04 1.00 
     
          
  
-0.77 -0.42 -0.42 -0.54 -0.67 -0.36 0.00 -0.53 
      
          
10 COMMLAND_t1_TA -0.04 -0.28 -0.24 -0.13 -0.02 -0.63 0.18 -0.03 0.01 1.00 
    
          
  
-0.49 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.71 0.00 -0.23 -0.67 -0.88 
     
          
11 COMMLAND_t2_TA 0.05 -0.14 -0.15 -0.02 0.01 -0.55 -0.54 -0.03 0.00 0.86 1.00 
   
          
  
-0.46 -0.02 -0.02 -0.72 -0.91 0.00 0.00 -0.66 -0.99 0.00 
    
          
13 ICA_t1_TA -0.02 0.31 0.29 0.21 0.00 -0.69 -0.09 -0.02 0.04 -0.12 -0.01 1.00 
  
          
  
-0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.96 0.00 -0.56 -0.72 -0.47 -0.04 -0.84 
   
          
14 ICA_t2_TA 0.03 0.32 0.33 0.22 0.03 -0.43 -0.60 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.19 0.70 1.00 
 
          
  
-0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.63 -0.01 0.00 -0.87 -0.76 -0.67 0.00 0.00 
  
          
15 ARR_total_TA 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.14 1.00 1.00 0.12 0.99 0.05 -0.25 -0.30 0.09 -0.04 1.00           
  
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.44 0.00 -0.39 0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.57 
 
          
16 CFOnet_TA 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.12 1.00 1.00 -0.31 0.99 0.03 -0.19 -0.11 0.16 0.16 1.00 1.00          
  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.62 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.00           
17 Depn_TA 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.17 1.00 1.00 -0.22 0.99 0.05 -0.46 -0.33 0.44 0.32 1.00 1.00 1.00         
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.15 0.00 -0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00          
18 EmployeeExpenses_TA 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 -0.03 0.99 0.03 -0.12 0.00 0.06 0.14 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00        
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.87 0.00 -0.66 -0.03 -0.98 -0.28 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00         
19 EquityTotal_TA -0.37 -0.37 -0.37 0.01 -0.37 -0.98 0.09 -0.37 -0.02 0.45 0.39 -0.28 -0.16 -0.37 -0.37 -0.37 -0.37 1.00       
  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.84 0.00 0.00 -0.55 0.00 -0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00        
20 RevenueBudgeted_TA 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.31 1.00 1.00 -0.09 0.99 0.00 -0.18 -0.11 0.09 0.10 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.37 1.00      
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.55 0.00 -0.99 0.00 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00       
21 RevenueTotal_TA 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.55 1.00 1.00 -0.14 0.99 0.02 -0.30 -0.17 0.19 0.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.37 1.00 1.00     
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.36 0.00 -0.74 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00      
22 OpGrant_TA 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.41 1.00 1.00 -0.18 0.99 0.04 -0.50 -0.42 0.26 0.13 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.37 1.00 1.00 1.00    
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
23 CapGrant_TA 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.11 0.90 0.90 -0.02 0.89 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 -0.33 0.90 0.90 0.90 1.00   
  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.89 0.00 -0.98 -0.38 -0.51 -0.13 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
24 NoEmployees_TA 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.58 1.00 1.00 -0.07 0.99 0.03 -0.22 -0.10 0.14 0.17 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.37 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.00  
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.65 0.00 -0.64 0.00 -0.10 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
25 population_TA 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.40 1.00 1.00 -0.21 0.99 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.11 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.37 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.16 0.00 -0.46 -0.67 -0.04 -0.94 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Note: p values are in italics p<0.1. Variables are as described in Table 1, excepting that all standardised by Total Assets in this Table (hence the “_TA” suffix). 
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Table 3: Determinants of Contracts (Contracts over threshold, Materials and Contracts Expense) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SCA_TA MCE_TA SCA_TA MCE_TA 
LogTotalAssets -0.0061 -0.0167*** -0.0056 -0.0090*** 
 (0.651) (0.000) (0.319) (0.000) 
COMMLANDREVAL_TA -0.0239 0.0005   
 (0.592) (0.931)   
ICAREVAL_TA 0.0101 -0.0017 0.0001 0.0000* 
 (0.794) (0.721) (0.455) (0.050) 
COMMLAND_t1_TA -0.0120 -0.0047***   
 (0.382) (0.006)   
ICA_t1_TA 0.0060 0.0024** 0.0001 0.0005 
 (0.462) (0.018) (0.980) (0.327) 
CFOnet_TA -0.2675 -0.0173 -0.0000 -0.0063 
 (0.455) (0.700) (1.000) (0.536) 
EmployeeExpenses_TA -0.4392 -0.2073*** 0.0901 0.0828* 
 (0.294) (0.000) (0.641) (0.076) 
EquityTotal_TA 0.1034 0.0823* -0.0134 0.0069 
 (0.767) (0.060) (0.773) (0.593) 
RevenueBudgeted_TA 0.0596 0.1181*** 0.0132 -0.0043 
 (0.798) (0.000) (0.423) (0.134) 
RevenueTotal_TA -0.0086 -0.0361** -0.0449 0.0824*** 
 (0.948) (0.029) (0.485) (0.000) 
PopPerEmp 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001* 0.0000*** 
 (0.963) (0.285) (0.073) (0.008) 
population 0.0000 0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000** 
 (0.890) (0.000) (0.167) (0.019) 
number of FTE employees EOY 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000*** 
 (0.533) (0.014) (0.102) (0.010) 
Constant 0.0343 0.2774*** 0.1272 0.1832*** 
 (0.945) (0.000) (0.316) (0.000) 
     
R-squared 0.1801 0.9760 0.0533 0.5320 
Observations 45 45 300 301 
Number of LGAcode 9 9 43 43 
Note: p values in parentheses, significance marked as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables are as described in 
Table 1. Variables described in Table 1 which have been standardised by Total Assets are renamed with a suffix of “_TA”. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Contracts (Contracts over threshold, Materials and Contracts Expense) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SCA_TA MCE_TA SCA_TA MCE_TA 
LogTotalAssets -0.0123 -0.0097*** -0.0052 -0.0069*** 
 (0.744) (0.002) (0.363) (0.000) 
COMMLANDREVAL_TA -0.0070 -0.0106   
 (0.948) (0.243)   
COMMLANDREVAL_t1_TA 0.0128 -0.0154**   
 (0.858) (0.011)   
ICAREVAL_TA 0.0020 0.0092 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.983) (0.243) (0.313) (0.189) 
ICAREVAL_t1_TA -0.0108 0.0130*** -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.857) (0.010) (0.774) (0.214) 
COMMLAND_t2_TA 0.0021 -0.0056**   
 (0.947) (0.036)   
ICA_t2_TA 0.0046 0.0034* 0.0016 0.0005 
 (0.839) (0.073) (0.463) (0.230) 
CFOnet_TA -0.8483 -0.1324** -0.0406 -0.0042 
 (0.191) (0.015) (0.430) (0.668) 
EmployeeExpenses_TA -1.9622 -0.0518 0.1968 0.0580 
 (0.381) (0.783) (0.293) (0.244) 
EquityTotal_TA 0.1313 0.0946** -0.0077 -0.0170 
 (0.806) (0.035) (0.874) (0.272) 
RevenueBudgeted_TA 0.3523 0.1890*** 0.0141 -0.0038 
 (0.551) (0.000) (0.325) (0.153) 
RevenueTotal_TA 0.1911 -0.0159 -0.0604 0.0791*** 
 (0.510) (0.515) (0.329) (0.000) 
PopPerEmp 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0000* 
 (0.602) (0.189) (0.052) (0.054) 
population 0.0000 0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000* 
 (0.993) (0.002) (0.131) (0.087) 
number of FTE employees EOY 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000* 
 (0.398) (0.037) (0.093) (0.068) 
Constant 0.0994 0.0990 0.1090 0.1654*** 
 (0.929) (0.290) (0.404) (0.000) 
     
R-squared 0.2632 0.9876 0.0829 0.5256 
Observations 36 36 257 258 
Number of LGAcode 6 6 43 43 
Note: p values in parentheses, significance marked as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables are as described in 




Table 5: Determinants of CEO & Management remuneration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CEO_REMUN_TA MGT_REMUN_TA CEO_REMUN_TA MGT_REMUN_TA 
LogTotalAssets 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001*** -0.0001 
 (0.897) (0.488) (0.000) (0.180) 
COMMLANDREVAL_TA -0.0001 0.0001   
 (0.699) (0.913)   
ICAREVAL_TA 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.793) (0.596) (0.783) (0.770) 
COMMLAND_t1_TA 0.0000 -0.0002   
 (0.955) (0.370)   
ICA_t1_TA 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 
 (0.431) (0.860) (0.087) (0.813) 
CFOnet_TA -0.0019 -0.0104 0.0000 -0.0006 
 (0.210) (0.124) (0.977) (0.475) 
EmployeeExpenses_TA -0.0013 -0.0116 0.0014** 0.0043 
 (0.473) (0.144) (0.019) (0.232) 
EquityTotal_TA -0.0011 0.0010 0.0002* 0.0004 
 (0.464) (0.880) (0.082) (0.672) 
RevenueBudgeted_TA 0.0022** 0.0080* 0.0000 -0.0002 
 (0.024) (0.069) (0.526) (0.322) 
RevenueTotal_TA 0.0003 0.0006 0.0004** 0.0032*** 
 (0.529) (0.814) (0.027) (0.003) 
PopPerEmp 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 
 (0.367) (0.685) (0.001) (0.649) 
population -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000*** -0.0000 
 (0.250) (0.117) (0.002) (0.680) 
number of FTE employees EOY -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 
 (0.810) (0.777) (0.041) (0.909) 
Constant 0.0009 0.0031 0.0025*** 0.0025 
 (0.659) (0.742) (0.000) (0.229) 
     
R-squared 0.8622 0.5910 0.7983 0.2697 
Observations 41 42 294 301 
Number of LGAcode 6 6 43 43 
Note: p values in parentheses, significance marked as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables are as described in 




Table 6: Determinants of CEO & MGT remuneration including lagged revaluations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CEO_REMUN_TA MGT_REMUN_TA CEO_REMUN_TA MGT_REMUN_TA 
LogTotalAssets 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0001*** -0.0002 
 (0.825) (0.341) (0.000) (0.150) 
COMMLANDREVAL_TA -0.0005 -0.0011   
 (0.194) (0.192)   
COMMLANDREVAL_t1_TA -0.0003 -0.0010*   
 (0.305) (0.065)   
ICAREVAL_TA 0.0004 0.0007 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.219) (0.369) (0.954) (0.784) 
ICAREVAL_t1_TA 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.216) (0.128) (0.747) (0.935) 
COMMLAND_t2_TA -0.0002 -0.0009***   
 (0.163) (0.000)   
ICA_t2_TA 0.0002* 0.0003 0.0000* -0.0000 
 (0.084) (0.122) (0.071) (0.578) 
CFOnet_TA 0.0008 0.0041 0.0000 -0.0009 
 (0.750) (0.413) (0.954) (0.253) 
EmployeeExpenses_TA 0.0081 0.0180 0.0004 0.0012 
 (0.348) (0.304) (0.439) (0.750) 
EquityTotal_TA -0.0002 -0.0064 0.0003* 0.0007 
 (0.906) (0.123) (0.072) (0.529) 
RevenueBudgeted_TA -0.0013 -0.0047 0.0000 -0.0002 
 (0.557) (0.304) (0.487) (0.309) 
RevenueTotal_TA -0.0005 -0.0037 0.0004** 0.0033*** 
 (0.655) (0.101) (0.012) (0.002) 
PopPerEmp -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 
 (0.390) (0.241) (0.001) (0.879) 
population 0.0000 0.0000* -0.0000*** -0.0000 
 (0.852) (0.070) (0.003) (0.907) 
number of FTE employees EOY -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 
 (0.280) (0.741) (0.020) (0.937) 
Constant -0.0001 0.0130 0.0026*** 0.0029 
 (0.973) (0.134) (0.000) (0.230) 
     
R-squared 0.8339 0.8722 0.8151 0.2328 
Observations 36 36 254 258 
Number of LGAcode 6 6 43 43 
Note: p values in parentheses, significance marked as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables are as described in 




Table 7: Determinants of Operating and Capital Grants 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OpGrants_TA CapGrants_TA OpGrants_TA CapGrants_TA 
LogTotalAssets -0.0111*** 0.1996 -0.0061*** 0.0083 
 (0.000) (0.175) (0.000) (0.674) 
COMMLANDREVAL_TA 0.0026 -2.1356***   
 (0.680) (0.000)   
ICAREVAL_TA -0.0018 2.1734*** 0.0000 0.0001 
 (0.761) (0.000) (0.939) (0.787) 
ICAREVAL_t1_TA   0.0000 0.0001 
   (0.965) (0.864) 
COMMLAND_t2_TA -0.0028* 0.0266   
 (0.050) (0.801)   
ICA_t2_TA 0.0032** 0.0868 -0.0001 -0.0251** 
 (0.016) (0.362) (0.863) (0.010) 
CFOnet_TA 0.0597 -5.2147* -0.0093 -0.3544 
 (0.168) (0.097) (0.339) (0.128) 
EmployeeExpenses_TA -0.2566*** -1.6842 -0.0516 -2.1040*** 
 (0.000) (0.652) (0.268) (0.001) 
EquityTotal_TA 0.0120 -2.0647 -0.0406*** 0.1303 
 (0.783) (0.512) (0.003) (0.394) 
RevenueBudgeted_TA -0.0665* 3.8952 -0.0039 -0.0560 
 (0.099) (0.183) (0.144) (0.394) 
RevenueTotal_TA -0.0072 1.2968 0.0205 1.5879*** 
 (0.647) (0.257) (0.118) (0.000) 
PopPerEmp -0.0001*** 0.0013 -0.0000** 0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.221) (0.044) (0.649) 
population 0.0000*** -0.0000 0.0000** -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.116) (0.047) (0.730) 
number of FTE employees 
EOY 
-0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.482) (0.763) (0.523) (0.741) 
Constant 0.2433*** -2.7487 0.1798*** -0.3130 
 (0.000) (0.573) (0.000) (0.497) 
     
R-squared 0.9222 0.7610 0.4499 0.2075 
Observations 39 39 258 258 
Number of LGAcode 9 9 43 43 
Note: p values in parentheses, significance marked as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables are as described in 




Table 8: Determinants of Depreciation and Asset Revaluation Reserve 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A – Contemporaneous DEPN_TE ARR_TA SCA_TA 
LogTotalAssets 0.0362*** 1.2976*** -0.0090* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.061) 
SCA_TA 0.2621 1.5821**  
 (0.219) (0.018)  
DEPN_TE   0.0162 
   (0.235) 
ARR_TA   0.0052 
   (0.125) 
CFOnet_TA 0.0990 1.2896* 0.0049 
 (0.661) (0.069) (0.933) 
EmployeeExpenses_TA -1.4545** 38.6243*** 0.0311 
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.859) 
EquityTotal_TA 0.0703 0.2371 -0.0157 
 (0.171) (0.144) (0.233) 
RevenueBudgeted_TA -0.0068 -0.3161 0.0162 
 (0.918) (0.122) (0.340) 
RevenueTotal_TA 0.5691** 3.7745*** -0.0597 
 (0.018) (0.000) (0.316) 
PopPerEmp -0.0007*** -0.0008 0.0001*** 
 (0.005) (0.511) (0.010) 
population 0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0000* 
 (0.227) (0.090) (0.072) 
number of FTE employees EOY -0.0001* -0.0014*** 0.0000** 
 (0.084) (0.000) (0.015) 
Constant -0.4937** -27.4536*** 0.1907* 
 (0.029) (0.000) (0.059) 
    
R-squared 0.2495 0.9999 0.9910 
Observations 343 343 343 
Number of LGAcode 43 43 43 
Note: p values in parentheses, significance marked as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables are as described in 
Table 1. Variables described in Table 1 which have been standardised by Total Assets are renamed with a suffix of “_TA”. 
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Table 8: Determinants of Depreciation and Asset Revaluation Reserve 
Panel B – Lagged SCA_TA 
LogTotalAssets -0.0000 
 (0.559) 
DEPN_TE (lagged one period) 0.0131 
 (0.344) 























Number of LGAcode 43 
Note: p values in parentheses, significance marked as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables are as described in 





Table 9: Determinants of Contracts (Contracts over threshold, Materials & Contracts expense, 
Materials & Contracts payments) 
Panel A: bottom quartile (1) (2) (3) 
 SCA_TA MCE_TA MCP_TA 
ICAREVAL_TAwinsorised(5%,95%) -0.0205 0.0055 0.0204 
 (0.417) (0.458) (0.110) 
ICAREVAL_t1_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0206 0.0017 0.0097 
 (0.299) (0.766) (0.347) 
ICA_t1_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0095 0.0017 0.0019 
 (0.244) (0.475) (0.648) 
CFONET_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.1583 -0.0585 -0.1319 
 (0.534) (0.392) (0.178) 
EmployeeExpenses_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.2578 -0.0181 -0.0962 
 (0.395) (0.812) (0.367) 
EquityTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0766 0.0145 -0.0129 
 (0.581) (0.666) (0.791) 
RevenueBudgeted_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0482 0.1766*** 0.3309*** 
 (0.801) (0.001) (0.000) 
RevenueTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0116 -0.0359 -0.1057* 
 (0.937) (0.375) (0.081) 
LogTotalAssets winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0077 -0.0086*** -0.0063* 
 (0.386) (0.000) (0.097) 
Constant -0.1952 0.1727*** 0.1490* 
 (0.270) (0.000) (0.060) 
R-squared 0.0517 0.4387 0.3521 
Observations 65 65 65 
Number of LGAcode 19 19 19 
    
Panel B: top quartile (1) (2) (3) 
 SCA_TA MCE_TA MCP_TA 
ICAREVAL_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0284 0.0084** 0.0041 
 (0.126) (0.016) (0.360) 
ICAREVAL_t1_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0054 0.0022 0.0012 
 (0.758) (0.476) (0.769) 
ICA_t1_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0024 0.0019 0.0014 
 (0.784) (0.298) (0.530) 
CFONET_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.1290 -0.0574 -0.1506** 
 (0.672) (0.302) (0.035) 
EmployeeExpenses_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.5961 0.0423 0.0007 
 (0.218) (0.718) (0.996) 
EquityTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.1009 -0.0093 -0.0192 
 (0.227) (0.716) (0.524) 
RevenueBudgeted_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.1726 0.0724 0.0742 
 (0.435) (0.128) (0.219) 
RevenueTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0217 0.0734** 0.0848** 
 (0.890) (0.028) (0.046) 
LogTotalAssets winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0014 -0.0044*** -0.0035** 
 (0.751) (0.001) (0.026) 
Constant -0.0534 0.1054*** 0.0987** 
 (0.697) (0.006) (0.033) 
R-squared 0.1503 0.4026 0.3568 
Observations 82 82 82 
Number of LGAcode 18 18 18 
Note: p values in parentheses, significance marked as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables are as described in Table 1. 
Variables described in Table 1 which have been standardised by Total Assets are renamed with a suffix of “_TA” and all variables have 
been winsorised by setting values below the 5th percentile and above the 95th percentile to those percentile values, respectively. 
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Table 10: Determinants of CEO & Management remuneration, by quartiles (winsorised variables) 
Panel A: bottom quartile (1) (2) 
 CEO_REMUN_TA MGT_REMUN_TA 
ICAREVAL_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0002* -0.0002 
 (0.073) (0.458) 
ICAREVAL_t1_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0000 0.0001 
 (0.863) (0.699) 
ICA_t1_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0000 -0.0002 
 (0.518) (0.185) 
CFONET_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0003 -0.0031 
 (0.797) (0.509) 
EmployeeExpenses_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0028** 0.0003 
 (0.018) (0.961) 
EquityTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0005 0.0048 
 (0.398) (0.151) 
RevenueBudgeted_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0006 0.0026 
 (0.436) (0.462) 
RevenueTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0007 0.0031 
 (0.277) (0.246) 
LogTotalAssetswinsorised(5%,95%) -0.0002*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.0042*** 0.0100*** 
 (0.000) (0.008) 
R-squared 0.5266 0.3867 
Observations 64 65 
Number of LGAcode 18 19 
   
Panel B: top quartile (1) (2) 
 CEO_REMUN_TA MGT_REMUN_TA 
ICAREVAL_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.726) (0.272) 
ICAREVAL_t1_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0000 0.0005*** 
 (0.338) (0.005) 
ICA_t1_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.259) (0.910) 
CFONET_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0001 -0.0127* 
 (0.953) (0.093) 
EmployeeExpenses_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0005 -0.0082 
 (0.795) (0.545) 
EquityTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0001 -0.0004 
 (0.758) (0.881) 
RevenueBudgeted_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0011 0.0072 
 (0.202) (0.221) 
RevenueTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0009 0.0024 
 (0.166) (0.562) 
LogTotalAssetswinsorised(5%,95%) -0.0001*** -0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.150) 
Constant 0.0019*** 0.0048 
 (0.000) (0.233) 
R-squared 0.4101 0.1266 
Observations 79 82 
Number of LGAcode 18 18 
Note: p values in parentheses, significance marked as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables are as described in 
Table 1. Variables described in Table 1 which have been standardised by Total Assets are renamed with a suffix of “_TA” 
and all variables have been winsorised by setting values below the 5th percentile and above the 95th percentile to those 
percentile values, respectively. 
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Table 11: Determinants of Operating and Capital Grants, by quartiles (winsorised variables) 
Panel A: bottom quartile (1) (2) 
 OpGrants_TA CapGrants_TA 
ICAREVAL_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0058 0.5128* 
 (0.301) (0.057) 
ICAREVAL_t1_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0010 0.0004 
 (0.811) (0.999) 
ICA_t2_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0009 -0.0343 
 (0.657) (0.736) 
CFOnet_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0144 -4.5203* 
 (0.850) (0.093) 
EmployeeExpenses_TA winsorised(5%,95%)1 -0.0841 -3.6772 
 (0.414) (0.203) 
EquityTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0105 -1.2162 
 (0.859) (0.423) 
RevenueBudgeted_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0634 0.0592 
 (0.230) (0.977) 
RevenueTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0516 4.0946** 
 (0.245) (0.014) 
LogTotalAssets -0.0069 -0.0755 
 (0.155) (0.719) 
Constant 0.1474 2.5476 
 (0.133) (0.548) 
R-squared 0.0000 0.3233 
Observations 48 48 
Number of LGAcode 14 14 
   
Panel B: top quartile (1) (2) 
 OpGrants_TA CapGrants_TA 
ICAREVAL_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.660) (0.351) 
ICAREVAL_t1_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0030 -0.0027 
 (0.225) (0.691) 
ICA_t2_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0004 0.0017 
 (0.819) (0.652) 
CFOnet_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0082 -0.0137 
 (0.905) (0.936) 
EmployeeExpenses_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.2257 -0.7444*** 
 (0.105) (0.005) 
EquityTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.0794*** 0.0779** 
 (0.004) (0.029) 
RevenueBudgeted_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.1134** -0.4979*** 
 (0.033) (0.000) 
RevenueTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.0780* 0.9923*** 
 (0.062) (0.000) 
LogTotalAssets -0.0056*** -0.0007 
 (0.000) (0.742) 
Constant 0.2025*** -0.0731 
 (0.000) (0.223) 
R-squared 0.6231 0.8664 
Observations 74 74 
Number of LGAcode 18 18 
Note: p values in parentheses, significance marked as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables are as described in 
Table 1. Variables from Table 1 have been standardised by Total Assets (a suffix of “_TA”) and all variables have been 
winsorised as described in Table 9. 
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Table 12: Determinants of Depreciation and Asset Revaluation Reserve,  
by quartiles (winsorised variables) 
Panel A: bottom quartile (1) (2) (3) 
 DEPN_TE ARR_TA SCA_TA 
SCA_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.4737 0.9946  
 (0.131) (0.385)  
DEPN_TE winsorised(5%,95%)   0.0491 
   (0.229) 
ARR_TA winsorised(5%,95%)   0.0100 
   (0.369) 
CFONET_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 1.0734* -1.2091 0.1553 
 (0.083) (0.603) (0.497) 
EmployeeExpenses_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -2.4116*** -4.0793 -0.0699 
 (0.000) (0.135) (0.792) 
EquityTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.8227*** 1.7706* 0.0975 
 (0.000) (0.063) (0.298) 
RevenueBudgeted_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.4115 -2.3457 0.0255 
 (0.375) (0.170) (0.879) 
RevenueTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.1925 -1.2565 -0.0193 
 (0.587) (0.330) (0.879) 
LogTotalAssetswinsorised(5%,95%) 0.0105 -0.0054 -0.0040* 
 (0.107) (0.855) (0.097) 
Constant 0.8714*** -0.7654 -0.0119 
 (0.000) (0.442) (0.895) 
R-squared  0.5962 0.1173 0.1655 
Observations 86 86 86 
Number of LGAcode 23 23 23 
    
Panel B: top quartile (1) (2) (3) 
 DEPN_TE ARR_TA SCA_TA 
SCA_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.6013* 0.5411  
 (0.052) (0.219)  
DEPN_TE winsorised(5%,95%)   0.0584 
   (0.128) 
ARR_TA winsorised(5%,95%)   0.0019 
   (0.872) 
CFONET_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -1.6835** -0.7311 -0.0601 
 (0.044) (0.532) (0.845) 
EmployeeExpenses_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -4.1609** 6.6566** -0.7823 
 (0.011) (0.023) (0.137) 
EquityTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) -0.8959*** -2.0078** 0.2152** 
 (0.007) (0.030) (0.017) 
RevenueBudgeted_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.9384 -0.6257 0.3378 
 (0.176) (0.545) (0.134) 
RevenueTotal_TA winsorised(5%,95%) 0.8326* -1.0755 0.0168 
 (0.097) (0.155) (0.924) 
LogTotalAssetswinsorised(5%,95%) 0.0198 0.3172*** -0.0020 
 (0.254) (0.000) (0.710) 
Constant 0.6311 -4.6361*** -0.1668 
 (0.190) (0.000) (0.179) 
R-squared  0.3010 0.3188 0.1694 
Observations 87 87 87 
Number of LGAcode 18 18 18 
Note: p values in parentheses, significance marked as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables are as described in 
Table 1. Variables from Table 1 have been standardised by Total Assets (a suffix of “_TA”) and all variables have been 
winsorised as described in Table 9. 
